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A Conspiracy of Life: A Posthumanist
Critique of Approaches to Animal Rights in
the Law
Barnaby E. McLaughlin
14 U. MASS. L. REV. 150
ABSTRACT
Near the end of his life, Jacques Derrida, one of the most influential philosophers of
the twentieth century, turned his attention from the traditional focus of philosophy,
humans and humanity, to an emerging field of philosophical concern, animals.
Interestingly, Derrida claimed in an address entitled The Animal That Therefore I Am
that,
since I began writing, in fact, I believe I have dedicated [my work]
to the question of the living and of the living animal. For me that
will always have been the most important and decisive question. I
have addressed it a thousand times, either directly or obliquely, by
means of readings of all the philosophers I have taken an interest
in. . . .
Derrida’s insistence that the question of the animal has always been the focus of his
work reflects an interesting turn in philosophy at the end of the twentieth century,
where the primacy of the human was rightfully being challenged, and the lives of
animals were being considered on their own terms. Increasingly, the shift in focus
from the primacy of the human to a more thoughtful consideration of animals has
moved outside of just philosophy into other academic fields. These developments
have been reflected in the emerging interdisciplinary field of posthumanism.
Posthumanism, inclusive of all disciplines, seeks to shed the legacy of liberal
humanism and the primacy of the human and instead consider all the interests of
those that the human shares the world with (including animals, plants, technology, et
cetera). Curiously however, while posthumanism has had an impact in most
disciplines, outside of a few scholars, it is absent in the legal field (both in academia
and in practice). Where the status of animals in the law has been challenged, it has
largely been done through arguments derived from the legacy of liberal humanism.
The two most significant challenges to the status of animals in the law have been
mounted by the Nonhuman Rights Project in the United States, and the Great Ape
Project, which has primarily been successful in New Zealand and Spain. Both
projects have sought to expand legal rights to hominids, though each has adopted
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different strategies. The Nonhuman Rights Project has sought to use arguments
within existing legal paradigms to force the courts to recognize chimpanzees as
“persons,” whereas the Great Ape project has intentionally avoided court (for fear of
setting unfavorable precedents) and favored pressing change through legislation.
Ultimately however, both projects are thoroughly rooted in liberal humanism and
advance their arguments through proximity claims—the idea that certain animals, in
these cases, apes, deserve legal consideration because of their similarity to humans.
This paper is an interdisciplinary comparative analysis of the Nonhuman Rights
Project’s failures in the United States and the Great Ape Project’s success in New
Zealand. The success of the legislative approach of the Great Ape Project
demonstrates the need to approach these arguments outside of the courtroom to avoid
hostile judges, philosophical legacies, and archaic precedents. However, the Great
Ape Project does not go far enough in expanding the rights of other beings as it relies
on emphasizing similarities with humans as the sole reason for extending rights,
leaving other beings, even higher order mammals like dolphins, without inclusion—
and a real possibility that any such inclusion would forever be cut off. Therefore, this
paper proposes the need for a posthumanist foundation for pursuing the rights of
other beings through legislative means.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation,
Jeremy Bentham signaled the complete break from the Cartesian world
by stating, “the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk?
but, Can they suffer?”1 With that reconfiguration, Descartes’s Bête
machine2 (animal-machine), would henceforth be little more than the
starting point of properly thinking about animals. Whereas philosophy
has taken Bentham’s question as a starting point for two hundred and
twenty-eight years of thinking seriously about non-human beings—
from Bentham’s utilitarian approach to posthumanism’s shared
finitude—the same has not been true in the law.3 This gap in

1

2

3

See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 311 n.1 (Hafner Publishing Co. 6th ed. 1948) (1789) (Bentham
develops his theory of Utilitarianism in this work and offers a challenge to the
dualism present in Descartes’s humanism.). See generally PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION (Harper Perennial ed. 2009) which is often seen as the
starting point of animal rights discourse in academia. Singer is a utilitarian in the
Bentham tradition and is the first to call attention to the obscure note in
Bentham’s principle work, sparking four decades of scholarly inquiry into
Bentham’s question.
See RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST
PHILOSOPHY (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 4th ed. 1998) (1637 &
1641) (where Descartes notoriously argues that the absolute division between
animals and humans is a result of humans being the only ones that possess a
consciousness (or a rational mind) and therefore, animals (and plants and all
other material things) are essentially machines); see, e.g., LAWRENCE CAHOON,
THE MODERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION: FROM DESCARTES TO DERRIDA, THE
GREAT COURSES (2010), https://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/modernintellectual-tradition-from-descartes-to-derrida.html
[http://perma.cc/WZZ8RNHZ] (“Descartes is a dualist . . . there’s only two boxes in which to put any
reality . . . regarding anything else that exists [other than humans], either: it’s
matter in motion—extended substance—a physical object like a rock, or it’s . . .
a human mind and a soul. This means, nonhuman living things, have no soul or
mind, they are purely physical, exactly like a machine . . . for Descartes, if I take
my pet rabbit and put it in a blender and turn on the blender . . . the scream that
the rabbit emits is not an indication that it feels pain. The rabbit feels no pain. It
feels no more pain than my fan belt does, which also screams if it needs
replacing, or if it’s very loose.”).
See CARY WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM? 49-98 (2010) (tracing the
developments in philosophy and liberal humanism post-Descartes and the
contemporary shift towards posthumanism); see also CARY WOLFE, BEFORE THE
LAW: HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS IN A BIOPOLITICAL FRAME (2013)
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consideration is reflected in the arguments that are articulated when
the law largely remains focused on the Cartesian/Bentham split as
reflected by two projects, the Nonhuman Rights Project4 and the Great
Ape Project,5 and the reactions to them.6 The Nonhuman Rights
project has recently lost attempts at writ of habeas corpus for
chimpanzees in New York,7 whereas the Great Ape Project has had
some success, most notably in New Zealand.8 The two projects have
however taken different strategies and lines of argument in pursuit of a
similar objective—expanding the legal rights of hominoids. The
Nonhuman Rights project has sought to use arguments within existing
legal paradigms to force the courts to recognize hominoids as
“persons,”9 whereas the Great Ape Project has intentionally avoided
court (for fear of setting unfavorable precedents) and favored pressing
change through legislation.10 The success of the legislative approach of

4

5

6

7

8

9
10

[hereinafter WOLFE, BEFORE THE LAW] (discussing liberal humanism’s
influence on law, the emergence of biopolitics, and a posthumanist response).
See NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/
[https://perma.cc/MKY9-9WJN] (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
See generally JANE GOODALL ET AL., THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY
BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., St. Martin’s Griffin ed.
1996) (a collection of essays that articulate the need to recognize the incredibly
close relationship between humans and great apes).
See Kelsey Kobil, When it Comes to Standing, Two Legs are Better than Four,
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 621, 642 (2015) (arguing against changing the status of
Apes and other animals to anything other than property).
See generally Steven M. Wise, Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights
Project, 17 ANIMAL L. 1 (2010) (discussing the strategy of bringing court
challenges to achieve the goals of the Nonhuman Rights Project); see also Debra
Cassens Weiss, Chimpanzees Lose Habeas Bid in New York’s Top Court; a
Judge Sees a ‘Manifest Injustice,’, A.B.A. J. (May 8, 2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chimpanzees_lose_habeas_bid_in_new
_yorks_top_court_one_judge_sees_a_manifes [http://perma.cc/7NBK-9HRC].
See Rowan Taylor, A Step at a Time: New Zealand’s Progress Toward Hominid
Rights, 7 ANIMAL L. 35, 37-40 (2001), for coverage of the legislative strategies
and successes of the Great Ape Project New Zealand.
See generally Wise, supra note 7.
See Taylor, supra note 8, at 42; see also, e.g., Alexandra B. Rhodes, Saving
Apes with the Laws of Men: Great Ape Protection in a Property-Based Animal
Law System, 20 ANIMAL L. 191, 227 (2013) (discussing how advocates for Great
Apes in the United States should work within the existing property rights system
of common law because Americans are not particularly receptive to the legal
personhood arguments).
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the Great Ape Project demonstrates the need to approach these
arguments outside the courtroom to avoid hostile judges11 and archaic
precedent.12 However, the Great Ape Project does not go far enough in
expanding the rights of others, because it largely relies on emphasizing
similarities with humans as the sole reason for extending rights.13
Therefore, the Great Ape Project leaves other beings, even higher
order mammals, such as dolphins and elephants, without inclusion—
and a real possibility that inclusion will forever be cut off.14 The
expansion of legal rights for nonhuman species should be pursued, not
only through legislative means, but also through a posthumanist
framework that insists that a multiplicity of species requires a
multiplicity of legal considerations.15
This Article, because it is interdisciplinary, begins by identifying
the similarities between common law identification of animals as
property16 and Descartes’s liberal humanist project.17 From there, this
Article traces the developments in philosophy that try to gradually
move away from the liberal humanist tradition, beginning with
Bentham and Singer’s utilitarianism, which emphasizes an ethics of
acting in the manner that causes the least suffering,18 and then moving

11
12

13
14

15

16

17

18

Taylor, supra note 8, at 42.
See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 10, at 195 (discussing the status of animals as
property under common law in the United States).
Taylor, supra note 8, at 41.
See id. (arguing that the Great Ape Project New Zealand should not align with
arguments about other animals’ legal rights and focus instead on the proximity
of great apes to humans).
See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, THE ANIMAL THAT THEREFORE I AM 32-48
(Marie-Louise Mallet ed., David Wills trans., Fordham U. Press. ed. 2008)
(discussing the arrogance of Man for giving themselves the right to encompass
all other species within the singular “animal”—and the need to develop an
approach that reflects a multiplicity); see also DONNA J. HARAWAY, WHEN
SPECIES MEET 4 (2008), for her discussion of the multiplicity of being—“[t]o be
one is always to become with many.”
See, e.g., Jessica Eisen, Liberating Animal Law: Breaking Free from HumanUse Typologies, 17 ANIMAL L. 59, 60 (2010).
See generally CARY WOLFE, ANIMAL RITES: AMERICAN CULTURE, THE
DISCOURSE OF SPECIES, AND POSTHUMANIST THEORY 1-44 (2003) (providing an
intricate discussion of the development of liberal humanism and its ultimate
poverty).
See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 1; see also, e.g., SINGER, supra note 1.
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to the capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum.19 The tracing of the
developments of philosophy in regard to nonhuman rights concludes
by a discussion of posthumanism as the absolute break from the liberal
humanist tradition.20 This Article then shifts back to the current legal
challenges that, like posthumanism, seek to break the Cartesian
tradition.21 Finally, this Article moves to discuss why a legislative
approach is more desirable than court challenges, while at the same
time the law currently lacks the vocabulary and philosophy to expand
beyond arguing to extend rights to the species most closely related to
humans.22 This Article concludes that posthumanism can fill the gaps
that are currently lacking in legal discourse and help articulate a true
vision for breaking from the Cartesian liberal humanist tradition.23
II. BACKGROUND: ANIMALS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
A. Animals in Common Law
When English common law was imported to the newly formed
United States, so too was the common law status of animals as
property.24 This classification of animals as property in common law
dates to the earliest forms of Western legal systems, when animals
were simply legal things.25 Steven Wise, the founder of the Nonhuman
Rights Project, clarifies that for the Romans, any being that was
“believed to lack free will—women, children, slaves, the insane, and
nonhuman animals—were all at some time classified as property.”26
This classification of animals as property is still one of the greatest

19

20
21
22

23
24

25
26

See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006) (discussing the limitations of
utilitarianism and articulating an alternative capabilities approach derived from a
unique reading of Aristotle).
See WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-98.
See generally NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4.
See generally Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42 (discussing the concerns with
aligning the Great Ape Project with animal rights in general).
See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3.
Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 471, 529-30 (1996).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 493.
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challenges for animal welfare laws because as property, animals have
no standing in court.27
B. Common Law and the Liberal Humanist Tradition
Steven Wise’s demonstration on how animals became property in
the law28 compliments the consideration of animals in philosophy.
Perhaps the most significant and still relevant consideration of animals
in the seventeenth century was Rene Descartes’s bête machine, which
considered animals as mechanistic—as machines—because they lack
consciousness.29 This Cartesian spilt, between beings with
consciousness (humans), and beings without, machines (animals), is
analogous to the Roman law classification as those with free will and
therefore legal persons, and those without, as property.30 Therefore,
the legal consideration of animals develops alongside the philosophical
development of, and challenges to, the liberal humanist tradition.31
C. Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer
As Cary Wolfe pointed out,32 even though Bentham’s now famous
rephrasing of the question of the animal to “Can they Suffer?” is now
ubiquitous for challenging the Cartesian liberal humanist tradition,
27
28

29
30
31

32

Rhodes, supra note 10, at 195.
See generally Wise, supra note 24 (providing an exhaustive account of the
historical antecedents that account for the current status of animals under
common law).
See generally DESCARTES, supra note 2.
See Wise, supra note 24, at 493.
See generally Cary Wolfe, Flesh and Finitude: Thinking Animals in
(Post)Humanist Philosophy, 37 SUBSTANCE 8 (2008) (arguing that the core of
humanism is the ethical and ontological divide between humans and nonhuman
animals).
Id.; see also WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-98 (tracing
the development of the question of the animal through the analytical, and
ultimately liberal humanist, philosophical tradition to the emergence of
posthumanism in continental philosophy and biopolitics). It is important to note
that while Wolfe’s analysis is excellent, it is by no means exhaustive and only
focuses on contemporary philosophers. Id. For instance, Martin Heidegger, a
significant figure when discussing the question of the animal, is only discussed
in relation to Jacques Derrida’s treatment of Heidegger’s work. Id. The strength
of Wolfe’s work is that it links his treatment of his contemporaries to the
philosophical traditions that they represent—providing an impressive historical
accounting of a philosophical divergence (perhaps more nuanced than analytic
versus continental) that explains how we got to where we are. Id.

158

UMass Law Review

v. 14 | 150

Bentham’s profound question was largely forgotten for nearly two
hundred years.33 It was not until Peter Singer “drew attention to a
passage buried . . . in a footnote in Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” in his seminal Animal
Liberation, that Bentham’s question became a focal point of the
question of the animal for philosophers.34 In Singer’s foundational
work, he took up Bentham’s question and tried to answer it within a
utilitarian framework.35 Singer’s utilitarian approach argued that if
animals and humans share an equal interest in something, like “the
interest in avoiding physical pain,” then “those interests are to be
counted equally, with no automatic discount just because one of the
beings is not human.”36 Singer’s utilitarianism, following Bentham’s,
identified “the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that
gives a being the right to equal consideration,”37 and therefore, any
question of how animals should be treated should be answered in the
way that most minimizes suffering.38
D. Limits of Utilitarianism and Marta Nussbaum’s
“Capabilities”
While utilitarianism does a great deal to challenge the Cartesian
world, it ultimately fails to escape a humanist discourse.39 Though
never articulated specifically, utilitarian insistence on “suffering” as
the prerequisite, applied analytically and dispassionately, does little to
articulate animals having interests in and of themselves that may be
separate from simply a shared and identifiable human-like
“suffering.”40 Additionally, Martha Nussbaum pointed out, because
utilitarianism focuses on calculations of pleasure/suffering to
determine the ethical, the cruel treatment of animals is not foreclosed
as unethical.41 In other words, “utilitarianism provides no way for
33
34
35

36

37
38
39
40
41

Wolfe, supra note 31, at 9.
Id.
See generally SINGER, supra note 1 (establishing the connection between a
utilitarian ethic and the necessity of animal rights).
WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 58 (quoting Peter Singer,
“Prologue: Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement”).
SINGER, supra note 1, at 7.
Id. at 21.
WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 62-64.
Id.
Id.
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animals to be direct subjects of justice.”42 The internal contradictions
of utilitarianism—in which not all animal interests are considered and
cruelty to an animal could be seen as the ethical choice—leads Wolfe
to consider Nussbaum’s Aristotelian43 “capabilities” approach.44
Nussbaum derived the capabilities approach from an ambiguity in
Aristotle’s configuration of humans as “political animals.”45 Man as
political animal locates man not as distinct being, wholly other, but as
a category of animal.46 For Nussbaum, this collapses the Cartesian
divide and therefore “the rightness or wrongness of our treatment of
. . . human or nonhuman . . . is . . . determined by the extent to which it
enables or impedes their ‘flourishing.’”47 Ultimately, flourishing as an
ethic argues “that no sentient animal should be cut off from the chance
for a flourishing life.”48 Wolfe was quick to point out that ultimately
Nussbaum suffered two fundamental flaws in her approach: first, does
human flourishing necessarily depend on animals suffering, and
second, the utilitarian problem of competing rights is also a problem
for Nussbaum’s flourishing.49 When confronted with competing
interests, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach amounts to a human
essentialism that prioritizes individual human capabilities against each
other, while also revealing a deep strain of humanism informing her
work.50
42
43

44

45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 64 (quoting Nussbaum).
Id. at 65. Wolfe takes care to note that Nussbaum does a lot of work reading into
an “ambiguity” in Aristotle to avoid the issue of “rationality as an ethical and
ontological dividing line.” Id.
Id. For whatever reason, Wolfe only briefly mentions an intermediary between
utilitarianism and Nussbaum, which is the contractarian theory of John Rawls
and others, which predicates rights on the ability to enter into contracts or some
other form of reciprocal relationship. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). Perhaps the quick logical dead-end to contractarianism—with
rights largely deriving from the reciprocal relationship between equals—does
not warrant a detailed consideration. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 327.
Ultimately, contractarianism is simply another way to articulate the Cartesian
splint on different grounds. Id.
WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 65-66.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67 (quoting Nussbaum).
Id. at 67.
See id. at 66-68 (discussing Nussbaum’s “List of Central Human Functional
Capabilities” and her ranking of some humans as apparently not-quite-human);
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E. Shared Finitude and Anti- and Post-humanist Philosophy
Wolfe’s exploration of the implications of Bentham’s
utilitarianism embodied in the work of Peter Singer and Martha
Nussbaum’s Aristotelian capabilities approach revealed that despite
valiant attempts to break from Cartesian humanism, Bentham, Singer
and Nussbaum ultimately were all unable to do so.51 Wolfe then
moved through Cora Diamond’s challenge to the very discourse of
rights.52 For Diamond, there was an important distinction between
rights and justice.53 Wolfe explained that “rights” are “trivialized” and
not equal the same as justice.54 Wolfe explained that “the language of
rights still bears the imprint of the context in which it was shaped:
Roman law and its codification of property rights—not least, of
course, property rights over slaves.”55 Therefore, rights discourse
invariably fails because the “tie between rights and a system of
entitlement that is concerned, not with evil done to a person, but with
how much he or she gets compared to other participants in the
system.”56 Diamond confronted the problem of rights discourse by
arguing that what should actually be the impetus of our moral concern
for animals is our shared vulnerability.57 In other words, rights
discourse in the analytic tradition, always itself inherently humanist,
can never purport to be about justice because it is inevitably based on
the “possession (or lack) of morally significant characteristics that can

51
52

53
54
55
56

57

see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 76-78 (listing the “Central Human
Capabilities” as follows: “1. Life . . . 2. Bodily Health . . . 3. Bodily Integrity . . .
4. Senses, Imagination Thought . . . 5. Emotions . . . 6. Practical Reason . . . 7.
Affiliation . . . 8. Other Species . . . 9. Play . . . 10. Control over One’s
Environment.”).
See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-69.
Id. at 70-78. Importantly, Wolfe notes that Diamond, though deeply skeptical of
what it means to “do” philosophy, is still herself very much of the analytic
tradition.
Id. at 73.
Id. (quoting Diamond).
Id. (paraphrasing Diamond).
Id. at 73-74 (quoting Diamond). It should be obvious that the classification of
animals as property under common law, which also derives from the Romans, is
a nearly unbreakable category when attacked through rights discourse because it
is, at its core, an epistemological dilemma.
Id. at 74 (arguing that the precarious nature of being alive, with death always
approaching, is where moral obligation arises).
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be empirically derived.”58 Diamond also took care to note that those in
the analytical tradition who seek to eliminate the lines between
humans and animals as the basis for animal rights, as well as those
who oppose animal rights because of this distinction, are both wrong.59
Wolfe explained that “for Diamond, it is not by denying the special
status of human being but by intensifying it that we can come to think
of nonhuman animals not as bearers of interests or as rights holders but
rather as something much more compelling: fellow creatures.”60
Although Diamond’s work is impressive and groundbreaking, it is of
the analytical tradition, and therefore there is an internal limitation that
prevents her from being able “to open the question of justice beyond
the human sphere alone.”61
To get past the limitations inherent in the analytical tradition,
Wolfe turned to the French continental philosopher, Jacques Derrida.62
With this shift from analytic to continental, Wolfe also signaled a
necessary shift away from liberal humanism and toward antihumanist
and posthumanist discourses.63 Wolfe’s move is instructive, and this
Article will argue that a similar move is necessary to truly challenge
the status of animals in the law.64
58
59
60
61

62
63

64

Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 80. Wolfe is concerned here with Diamond’s understanding of language in
a philosophical sense, or perhaps her lack of accounting for language. Id. Wolfe
sees Jacques Derrida’s theory of language and trace as a necessary component of
opening the question of justice. Id. at 80-98.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 80-98. See also, generally, GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, A
THOUSAND PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 232-310 (Brian
Massumi trans., U. of Minn. Press ed. 1987) (developing an anti-humanist
position through the concepts of “becoming,” including most famously,
“becoming-animal.” Becoming is a resistance to the hierarchical structure of
humanism by arguing for shifts from majority to minority positions, but
importantly, not absolute shifts from one position to another—or one identity to
another—but rather an always ongoing process of making anew). Contra,
HARAWAY, supra note 15, at 30 (“Despite the keen competition, I am not sure I
can find in philosophy a clearer display of misogyny, fear of aging, incuriosity
about animals, and horror at the ordinariness of flesh, here [in A Thousand
Plateaus] covered by the alibi of an anti-Oedipal and anticapitalist project.”).
See generally WOLFE, BEFORE THE LAW, supra note 3 (a thoughtful exploration
of the status of animals before the law and how biopolitics can be understood in
that context); see also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER
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III. APPROACHES TO ADVANCING ANIMAL STATUS
UNDER THE LAW: A POSTHUMANIST CRITIQUE
A. NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT & THE GREAT APE
PROJECT
The Nonhuman Rights Project is perhaps the best-known
organization working on animal rights in the law.65 Founded by Steven
M. Wise, the Nonhuman Rights Project aims to advance the status of
animals primarily through court challenges.66 Although the group has a
variety of objectives, five in all, this Article’s focus is on its first
objective, to recategorize animals under the law.67 In this objective, the
Nonhuman Rights Project aims “[t]o change the common law status of
great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales from mere ‘things,’ which
lack the capacity to possess any legal right, to ‘legal persons,’ who
possess such fundamental rights as bodily liberty and bodily
integrity.”68 In order to do this, the Nonhuman Rights Project has
identified favorable jurisdictions and judges and seeks to file writs of
habeas corpus and de homine replegiando.69
The most recent and one of the most prolific challenges from the
Nonhuman Rights Project concerns two chimpanzees named Hercules

BARE LIFE (Werner Hamacher & David E. Wellbery eds., Daniel HellerRoazen trans., Stanford U. Press ed. 1998) (discussing how law functions under
sovereign power and the possibilities, or lack of possibilities, of anomic space—
a space that conceivably nonhuman entities would inhabit).
See NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4.
See
Who
We
Are,
NONHUMAN
RIGHTS
PROJECT,
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/who-we-are/
[http://perma.cc/L4BL-EJ23]
(last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
Id. The five objectives of the Nonhuman Rights Project are: 1) To get great apes,
elephants, dolphins, and whales recognized as “legal persons,” 2) to expand the
considerations of other qualities that could further expand animals that could be
considered “legal persons,” 3) to promote recognition of ethical and legal
consideration of nonhuman animals, 4) to build a coalition to help secure legal
rights for nonhuman animals, and 5) “To foster understanding of the social,
historical, political, and legal justice of our arguments and the scientific
discovery of other species’ cognitive and emotional complexity that informs
them.” Id.
Id.
Wise, supra note 7, at 8.
AND
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67
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and Leo that were leased to Stony Brook University.70 Hercules and
Leo were experimented on for six years, having electrodes inserted
into their muscles so that researchers could study how humans evolved
to walk upright.71 The Nonhuman Rights Project filed a writ of habeas
corpus in a New York state court on behalf of Hercules and Leo.72 The
court denied the petition73 and the Nonhuman Rights Project
appealed.74 The appeal was erroneously denied,75 and the Nonhuman
Rights Project subsequently took advantage of the ability to file writs
of habeas corpus multiple times under New York law and re-filed on
behalf of Hercules and Leo.76 Surprisingly, the judge ordered the New
York Attorney General to appear and “show cause” why an order
should not be granted to the Nonhuman Rights Project for relief.77 The
judge’s order stated that “upon a determination that Hercules and Leo
are being unlawfully detained, [they are ordered for] immediate release
and transfer forthwith to Save the Chimps.”78 This is a significant
victory for the Nonhuman Rights Project because a hearing to
determine whether a nonhuman was properly detained had never been
granted.79 Unfortunately, the judge, although seemingly cognizant of
the potential merits of the case, denied the writ of habeas corpus.80
Nevertheless, the Nonhuman Rights Project declared that even getting
into the courtroom to hear the rights of a nonhuman animal was a
70

71
72
73

74
75

76
77

78
79
80

Clients:
Hercules
and
Leo,
NONHUMAN
RIGHTS
PROJECT,
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/hercules-leo/
[http://perma.cc/T9L7-2Q8X]
(last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
Id.
Id.
Order to Show Cause Declined, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules
& Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. Dec. 5, 2013)
(No. 13-32098).
Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70.
Decision & Order on Motion, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules &
Leo v. Stanley, (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t Apr. 3, 2014) (No. 2014-01825).
Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70.
Amended Order to Show Cause, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules
& Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Apr. 21, 2015)
(No. 152736/15).
Id.
Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70.
Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16
N.Y.S.3d 898, 917-18 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
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victory.81 On this point, the Nonhuman Rights Project’s success and
strategy are admirable, however, as will be shown, from a
posthumanist perspective they can be dangerous.82
While the Nonhuman Rights Project seeks to advance nonhuman
animal rights through court challenges, a similar project, The Great
Ape Project, employs a different strategy.83 The Great Ape Project has
had much more success in accomplishing tangible victories in securing
certain fundamental rights for Great Apes.84 The Great Ape Project has
been successful in getting legislation passed that helps protect great
apes, sometimes even extending human like rights to great apes.85 One
of the ways that the Great Ape Project has made progress is by
deliberately avoiding courts for fear of longstanding bias and
speciesism causing judges to set negative precedents.86 The Great Ape
Project’s successes, particularly in New Zealand and Spain are
impressive.87
The Great Ape Project’s greatest successes so far have come in
New Zealand, beginning with the passage of the Animal Welfare Act
of 1999.88 The Great Ape Project New Zealand had pressed for the
inclusion of both a guardianship model for representation as well as
specific rights for great apes.89 Although Great Ape Project New
Zealand’s admittedly lofty demands were quickly rejected, Great Ape
Project New Zealand was successful in carving out special recognition
for hominids.90 This special recognition of the status of hominids was
made tangible by a ban on the use of great apes in teaching, product
testing, and research.91 However, the ban is not categorical and can be
81
82

83

84
85
86
87

88
89
90
91

Clients: Hercules and Leo, supra note 70.
See generally LEONARD LAWLOR, THIS IS NOT SUFFICIENT: AN ESSAY ON
ANIMALITY AND HUMAN NATURE IN DERRIDA (2007).
See
generally
GREAT
APE
PROJECT
BRAZIL,
http://www.projetogap.org.br/en/mission-and-vision/
[http://perma.cc/D5ZRAS4Z] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
Rhodes, supra note 10, at 210-15.
Id.
Taylor, supra note 8, at 42.
See, e.g., id. for a discussion of the Great Ape Project’s successes in New
Zealand; see also, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 10, at 210-15.
See Taylor, supra note 8, at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37-38.
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overcome if the use is “in the best interest of the individual great ape
or is in the interest of that great ape’s species and the benefits are not
outweighed by the likely harm to the great ape.”92 Significantly,
although it does not codify “rights” for great apes, it does introduce a
concept of “interests,” for both the species and the individual ape.93 In
addition, where conflicts between species and individuals may arise,
the act prioritizes the individual by making sure any benefits do not
“outweigh” any potential harm to the individual.94 Although Great Ape
Project New Zealand did not achieve a recognition of rights, it did
secure some form of recognition that had never before been conferred
to a non-human animal.95 With that said, the Great Ape Project’s legal
strategy, like the Nonhuman Rights Project’s approach, has some
fundamental limitations that might set back animal rights under the
law.96
B. A POSTHUMANIST CRITQUE
Though the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project
are fundamentally different in both tactics and objectives, they
nevertheless share the same limitations and problems, which derive
from tradition.97 Much like Singer, Nussbaum and Diamond are
fundamentally limited by the humanist core of the analytic tradition; so
too are the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project

92

93
94

95
96

97

Id. at 38 n.16 (quoting Primary Production Committee, Primary Production
Committee Reports Back on Animal Welfare Legislation (press release) (May
17, 1999)).
Id.
Id. The valuing of the individual, rather than the group, is an interesting
acknowledgement of the individual’s interest in their self—in other words, it
implicitly recognizes that the individual has some sense of self.
Id.
See generally JANE GOODALL ET AL., THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY
BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., U.S. ed. 1994) (a
collection of essays from well-known academics in various fields that are
unified in arguing for rights for great apes because of their similarities to
humans).
See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 49-98
(discussing the analytic tradition and the pervasiveness of liberal humanism ’as
they relate to the question of the animal); see also, e.g., Wise, supra note 24, at
8-10 (demonstrating how tradition shapes common law notions of how to
account for animals).
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limited by both the humanist core of common law tradition and their
ultimately humanist approach to attaining animal rights.98
The Nonhuman Rights Project has two fundamental problems with
its approach and objective.99 First is what Great Ape Project New
Zealand identified as the problem with bringing court challenges.100
The second is that the Nonhuman Rights Project’s strategy risks
making an argument for a biological continuum.101 In both cases, the
negative consequences of the Nonhuman Rights Project could hinder
any progress that has been made in animal rights law.102
The first problem that the Nonhuman Rights Project’s approach
faces is what Taylor describes as the “hominid cringe,”103 and the
possibility of a resistance to their efforts because of slippery slope
arguments.104 These two issues are the main problems with having
judges decide cases and set possible precedent.105 The “hominid
cringe” refers to the reluctance of humans to admit that they vary only
slightly in genetics from their ape counterparts.106 This resistance can
be the basis of a speciest disposition that many people possess.107 Such
a disposition might lead judges automatically, regardless of reason and
logic, to dismiss any challenge that calls into question human
exceptionalism.108 Worse still, decisions derived primarily from a
98
99
100

101
102

103
104
105

106
107

108

See, e.g., Wise, supra note 24.
See generally NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4.
See Taylor, supra note 8, at 42 (highlighting the possibility of encountering
conservative justices and setting unfavorable precedent).
See generally LAWLOR, supra note 82.
Contra Wise, supra note 7 (arguing that the only way to change the existing
common law is to systematically identify states, districts, and even particular
judges, that might be receptive to the Nonhuman Rights Project’s arguments and
therefore, be willing to go against precedent).
Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42.
Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-40.
Id. at 636-37. Much of Kobil’s argument is that only a “rogue” court could
change precedent and therefore, the common law tradition of treating animals as
property should be protected against the threat of judicial activism.
Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42.
See generally Frank Newport, In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human
Origins, GALLUP (June 2, 2014) http://news.gallup.com/poll/170822/believecreationist-view-human-origins.aspx [https://perma.cc/35CP-TF7V] (42 percent
of Americans do not believe in evolution but rather, that a deity created humans
in their exact present form).
Taylor, supra note 8, at 42.
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speciest logic would set precedent for future cases, making animal
legal recognition even more difficult to attain.109
The second problem that the Nonhuman Rights Project’s approach
faces is the fear of a slippery slope.110 If Great Apes receive
personhood, then what’s next? Dolphins? Pigs? Dogs? Salamanders?
Microbes?111 There is a real fear among humanists (a valid fear, but
not for the reasons they articulate) that by admitting our Ape cousins
into the sphere of ethical and legal consideration, eventually every
animal will have to be admitted to the once exclusive domain of
humans.112 The slippery slope argument, as will be shown, is valid—
however, not because of this humanist logic.113
The Great Ape Project’s approach faces similar problems that
largely derive from their utilitarian origins.114 The Great Ape Project’s
utilitarian logic opens it up to all of the same critiques that Diamond
and Wolfe level at utilitarianism in philosophy, namely that the
analytic empirical calculation of suffering invariably excuses and
permits a great deal of suffering.115 In addition, the Great Ape
Project’s narrow focus on great apes might foreclose the possibility of
other animals, such as dolphins, whales and octopuses, from receiving
similar legal consideration because we cannot articulate the same
arguments of proximity to humanness.116 Finally, another issue that the
Great Ape Project’s approach faces is the common law property
problem, because where the Great Ape Project sees its strategy as a
way of working within the property system by simply removing great
apes from a classification as property, it inevitably leaves all other
species still classified as property.117
109
110
111
112

113
114
115
116

117

Id.
Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-40.
Id.
Id. Kobil goes further to worry that environmentalist might seize on the success
of animal rights activist and start articulating similar lines of arguments for the
rights of trees or rivers to bring court challenges. See id. at 641.
LAWLOR, supra note 82.
GOODALL ET AL., supra note 96.
WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 64.
See Taylor, supra note 8, at 41 (discussing the need to avoid aligning great ape
rights with a larger animal rights discourse).
See generally Rhodes, supra note 10 (advocating for working within the
property system in spite of its limitations because Americans are not receptive to
perceiving animals as beings with personhood).
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C. POSTHUMANISM OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH
Posthumanism offers an alternative to the problems that emerge
from the largely humanist projects of the Nonhuman Rights Project
and the Great Ape Project.118 As noble as the Nonhuman Rights
Project and the Great Ape Project are, the very concept of saving
animals with the laws of men is specious.119 To combat the legacy of
liberal humanism, which manifests in common law, a posthumanist
perspective must be adopted.120
1. The Anthropological Limit, Multiplicities, and Avoiding the
Slippery Slope
The first and most significant problem that posthumanism
addresses is the valid concern of a slippery slope.121 The slippery slope
argument is the concern that the recognition of one species of animal
in any capacity other than property will necessarily lead to endless
expansion of considerations that overburden courts and result in
absurdities.122 Perhaps more than any other argument, the concern of a
slippery slope is the most commonly articulated.123 For example, the
118

119

120

121
122
123

See
generally
Posthumanities,
U.
OF
MINN.
PRESS,
https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/series/posthumanities
[http://perma.cc/RJ2A-CK6G] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (an interdisciplinary
book series edited by Cary Wolfe that contributes to the growing field of
Posthumanities).
Contra Rhodes, supra note 10 (arguing that all the existing frameworks are there
to advance animal rights, and challenging them with too radical of propositions
will be a self-defeating strategy).
See generally Maneesha Deckha, Critical Animal Studies and Animal Law, 18
ANIMAL L. 207 (2012) (arguing that a more aggressive subset of posthumanism,
Critical Animal Studies, is where legal scholars should turn to escape the liberal
humanist legacy). Although Deckha is correct, a more general intervention of
Posthumanism will allow for more possibilities and a general consideration of
the biopolitical, and therefore, should be pursued alongside the goals of Critical
Animal Studies.
See Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-40.
Id.
See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Next Rights Revolution?: It’s Bowser’s
Time at Last, 51 NAT’L REV. 44 (1999) (suggesting that all of human society
would cease to exist if animals were regarded as anything other than property).
Presumably, the chaos that would result from allowing animals standing or some
other form of recognition in court is because of the abysmal conditions in which
many animals live their lives under human domain.
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slippery slope argument often arises when pet owners pursue claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress.124 In Rabideau v. City of
Racine, the judge explicitly denied the claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress as a matter of public policy.125 Judge Bablitch states
that “[w]e are particularly concerned that were such a claim [as
negligent infliction of emotional distress] to go forward, the law would
proceed upon a course that had no just stopping point.”126 He
continues, “[w]ere we to recognize a claim for damages for the
negligent loss of a dog, we can find little basis for rationally
distinguishing other categories of animal companion.”127 Although it
would seem that a rational test could be developed to distinguish
between the companionship that a goldfish provides from the
companionship that a dog provides, it is irrelevant to the underlying
logic that a slippery slope would result in chaos128 and the possible
collapse of human society.129
The fear of a slippery slope—the impending biological
continuum—that emerges in law is the result of the liberal humanist
tradition that posthumanism seeks to challenge.130 The terror that
Epstein, Judge Bablitch, and others express is the result of a possible
destabilization of the supremacy of the human131 and, therefore, a
collapse of liberal humanism. Although the supremacy of the human
under liberal humanism is precisely the location of the permissible
atrocities committed by humans to animals, the unease of a biological
continuum is not without warrant.132 However, the reason for that
unease is not because of upsetting the supremacy of the human, rather

124

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

See Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 797-98 (Wis. 2001), where a
companion animal, a dog, was shot and killed by a police officer and the dog’s
human companion sought damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The court concludes that the only damages available are for property loss.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 799.
Id.
Kobil, supra note 6, at 638.
Epstein, supra note 123.
See generally WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3.
See generally Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42 (discussing the “hominid cringe”).
See DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 29-30, where Derrida insists that the absolute
division between human and nonhuman animal must be maintained.
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a much more sinister concern with dissolving the anthropological
limit.133
French Philosopher Jacque Derrida expressed the anti-humanist, or
posthumanist, insistence on maintaining a human/animal divide during
his ten-hour address to the 1997 Cerisy conference.134 Derrida was
aware that his attack on the anthropological limit would have two
risks: first, the obvious risk of slipping back into the liberal humanist
paradigm, and second, the specter of biological continuism.135 Derrida
states that he “never believed in some homogeneous continuity
between what calls itself man and what he calls the animal” and that he
wasn’t “about . . . to do so now.”136 Derrida continued to insist that
anyone who argues for some complete dissolution of the
anthropological limit should be met with suspicion, stating:
When that cause or interest seeks to profit from what it
simplistically suspects to be a biologistic continuism,
whose sinister connotations we are well aware of, or
more generally to profit from what is suspected as a
geneticism that one might wish to associate with this
scatterbrained accusation of continuism, at that point
the undertaking becomes in any case so aberrant that it
neither calls for nor, it seems to me, deserves any direct
discussion on my part.137
Derrida’s insistence on maintaining the anthropological limit is
derived from the “sinister connotations” of dissolving the limit;138
133

134

135

136
137

138

Id. at 30. The anthropological limit is the “rupture . . . between those who say
‘we men,’ . . . and . . . what he calls the animal or animals.” Id. Essentially, the
rupture created by the Cartesian moment—the division between man and all
other animal life—that liberal humanism is predicated upon.
See generally id. The Animal that Therefore I Am is the subsequent translation
and publication of Derrida’s address to the Cerisy conference. The Colloques de
Cerisy are a series of seminars by important, primarily French, intellectuals that
take place at the Centre culturel international de Cerisy-la-Salle. They are
foundational to building contemporary French intellectual culture.
Id. at 30. Derrida is using biological continuism to describe a hierarchy of
beings that contains no absolute divisions between species.
Id.
Id. Derrida is challenging both the consideration of animals and rights in the
analytic tradition, which inevitably results in a deterioration of the
anthropological limit, but also the more “sinister” result of continuism.
Id.
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however, he failed to elaborate on this point.139 Leonard Lawlor, in his
essay about Derrida’s address, clarified that “if one raises animals to
the level of humans, or if one lowers humans to the level of animals,
one ignores the difference that requires living beings to be treated in a
variety of ways.”140
Derrida’s—and by extension, posthumanism’s—insistence on
maintaining the anthropological limit negates the concern for a
slippery slope.141 By securing an absolute position of difference from
all other animals for all humans, Derrida prevents the inevitable
catastrophe and apocalyptic collapse “of human society” that Epstein
is concerned about.142 However, unlike the Cartesian divide in liberal
humanism, Derrida explains that the anthropological limit cannot be
seen as single and indivisible.143 Instead the limit must be conceptually
thought of as abyssal.144 Derrida states that it must be abyssal:
Not just because . . . [this talk] will concern what
sprouts or grows at the limit, around the limit, by
maintaining the limit, but also what feeds the limit,
generates it, raises it, and complicates it. Everything
I’ll say will consist, certainly not in effacing the limit,
but in multiplying its figures, in complicating,
thickening, delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line
precisely by making it increase and multiply.145
This “delinearizing” and “multiplying” of limits is recognition that the
absolute position of the human is mirrored by the absolute position of
139
140

141
142
143
144

145

Id.
See generally LAWLOR, supra note 82, at 25-26. Essentially, the creation of a
continuum allows for any being on that continuum to slide up and down—and
when we consider that Derrida is an Algerian Jew, the “sinister connotations”
are likely a reference to anti-Semite ideologies, particularly Nazism, that slid
Jews down the continuum and therefore Nazis were able to justify their
atrocities as permissible. Id. at 24-27. Slavery in the Americas and colonialism
are also examples where the elimination of the limit allowed for some humans to
be more human than others. Id. Derrida insists that the limit be maintained to
prevent human atrocities from ever becoming permissible. Id.
See generally Kobil, supra note 6, at 639-41 (discussing the “slippery slope”).
Epstein, supra note 123.
DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 31.
Id.; see Serge Margel, Derrida and the Power of Words, 36 OXFORD LITERARY
REV. 254, 255-56 (2014) (discussing how Derrida uses “abyssal” in his work).
DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 29.
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the great ape and the absolute position of the octopus—creating a
multiplicity of limits between species and necessitating individual
evaluations of interspecies relationships.146
To facilitate the conceptualization of the multiplicity of the limits,
Derrida challenged the use of the word animal— “a word that men
have given themselves the right to give.”147 Derrida argued that “[m]en
would be first and foremost those living creatures who have given
themselves the word that enables them to speak of the animal with a
single voice and to designate it as the single being.”148 Derrida,
therefore, identified the lexical anthropological limit that results in the
binary division between human and the multiplicity of all other
species, collapsed into the singular animal.149 This lexical problem is
precisely the problem that confronts the Great Ape Project as it at once
seeks to maintain the limit but also to allow a single species to jump to
the human side.150 Derrida challenges the singular generality of “the
animal” by purposing the neologism, animot.151 Animot, in French,
“sounds like animaux, animals in the plural.”152 Derrida’s neologism is
designed for “us to hear in the term animot animals in their plural
singularity rather than their generality (i.e., The Animal).”153 Again, by
insisting on this neologism, Derrida tried to destabilize the Cartesian
single and indivisible anthropological limit, while maintaining
146

147
148
149
150
151
152

153

LAWLOR, supra note 82; see also HARAWAY, supra note 15, at 3-45 (Haraway,
another foundational figure in posthumanism, further complicates this notion of
abyssal limits between species by also suggesting at the same time that the
species do not exist without the encounter of the other—in other words, species
(to the microbial level) make each up. This suggests that the multiplicity of
limits must also account for a multiplicity and the necessity of contact zones
between species).
DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 32.
Id.
Id. at 1-50.
See generally Taylor, supra note 8, at 41.
See generally DERRIDA, supra note 15.
MATTHEW CALARCO, ZOOGRAPHIES: THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL FROM
HEIDEGGER TO DERRIDA 144 (1972).
Id. (Calarco suggests Derrida’s desire is for a plural singularity in animot—in
other words, each species, like the human, is absolute in its species being,
however there are infinite abyssal limits between each species (a plurality of
limits) and therefore, there must also be a plurality of relationships and ethical
obligations between species).
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absolute divisions between species.154 In doing so, Derrida at once
avoided the slippery slope155 and avoided the “hominid cringe.”156 At
the same time, Derrida opened the possibility of a multiplicity of
relationships (and therefore, a need for a multiplicity of legal
considerations) between species.157
2. Great Apes Are Not Enough: Thinking Obligations Beyond
Familiarity
Both the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project,
unsurprisingly, have focused their efforts on securing legal rights for
great apes.158 The reasons for pursuing rights for great apes are based
on an argument for familiarity because of familial proximity.159
However, two issues with this approach arise: first, any victories won
would not in and of themselves extend to other species,160 and second,
the proximity or familiarity arguments risk further entrenching liberal
humanism in law.161 Posthumanism offers a way to address these
issues by proposing a clear break from the liberal humanist tradition
and thinking anew where ethical obligations between species arise.162

154
155
156
157
158

159

160

161

162

See generally DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 29-50.
LAWLOR, supra note 82.
Taylor, supra note 8, at 41-42.
LAWLOR, supra note 82.
See NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4; see also GOODALL ET AL., supra
note 5.
GOODALL ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-5. Humans are part of the great ape family
and therefore the extension of rights to other great apes, chimpanzees, gorillas,
and orangutans, makes sense.
Taylor, supra note 8, at 41 (arguing that aligning The Great Ape Project with
other animal rights would be a strategic error and that Apes are a worthy enough
cause in and of themselves, and thus there need not be any larger consideration
of other animals); see also WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3
(identifying that the utilitarianism, and ultimately all analytical philosophy, both
of which have a foundation in liberal humanism, always allow for a great deal of
animal, and sometimes human, suffering to continue unabated).
Deckha, supra note 120, at 232 (arguing that The Great Ape Project’s “traitbased” argument, or proximity to humanness, ultimately just reinforces
anthropocentrism (the liberal humanist legacy) of the current legal order).
See generally WOLFE, supra note 17 (outlining how liberal humanism develops
and affects our understanding of animals and by extension, how we understand
ourselves).
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The philosophies that flow out of the analytic tradition, including
the utilitarianism that animates so much of the legal discourse around
animal rights, largely serve to only reinforce liberal humanism and
reduce “questions of justice to questions of entitlement.”163
Posthumanism however seeks to relocate the nexus of ethical
consideration away from the identification of human-like-ness—
through traits and capabilities—to shared vulnerability, shared
finitude.164 Wolfe explained:
[T]here are two kinds of finitude here [that human and
non-human animals share], two kinds of passivity and
vulnerability. The first type (physical vulnerability,
embodiment, and eventually mortality) is paradoxically
made unavailable, inappropriable, to us by the very
thing that makes it available—namely, a second type of
“passivity” or “not being able,” which is the finitude
we experience in our subjection to a radically ahuman
technicity or mechanicity of language, a technicity that
has profound consequences, of course, for what we too
hastily think of as “our” concepts, which are therefore
in an important sense not “ours” at all.165
Finitude, therefore, exists in both our shared mortality and proximity
to death, but also in the limitation of the human’s relationship with
itself.166 In other words, man’s knowing of himself, which only
happens through the technicity of language, is the second limitation—
second vulnerability—and a form of finitude.167 The rendering of
man’s relationship to himself is unstable, so too then, is man’s
relationship to all other beings rendered unstable.168 Wolfe explained
that the “most radical sense of Derrida’s posthumanism” is in the
location of the “generative force of the nonliving at the origins of any
living being, human or animal, who communicates (and this in the
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WOLFE, WHAT IS POSTHUMANISM?, supra note 3, at 79.
Id. at 80 (Wolfe latches on to Derrida’s conception of ethics as the ethical
foundation posthumanism—the sharing of finitude among species).
Id. at 88.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
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broadest sense) with another.169 Wolfe continued: “For these
reasons—because of the estrangement of the ‘“the human’” from the
‘“auto-’” that ‘“we’” give to ourselves—the relation[ship] between the
human and the nonhuman animals is constantly opened anew and, as it
were, permanently.”170 Therefore, it is through this relocation of
ethics, of obligations between species, to this passivity—to shared
finitude—that posthumanism offers a radical departure from the
humanist tradition.171 The “estrangement” between species is mirrored
by the “estrangement” through the technicity of language for man to
himself172 and thus, places man not in some vaulted category above all
else, but rather in the same position as other species.173
The shift to shared finitude upends the legacy of liberal humanism
and opens the possibility of new considerations.174 It removes blanket
categorizing of ethical obligations and instead insists on a
heterogeneity of obligations.175 This insistence removes the possibility
of proximity arguments—of how human like another species is176—
from the equation and instead insists on the heterogeneity of
considerations that may be offered and the multiplicity of the solutions
possible.177 Moreover, this heterogeneous approach to ethical
considerations necessarily would entail a move that never forecloses
the possibilities of considerations for other species or other rights.178
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finitude to shared fortitude opens up a possibility for considering ethics on a
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3. There Are No Models: Species Specific Legislation and a
New Paradigm
What exactly a posthumanist application of the law to animals
would look like is difficult to conceive because it has never been
done—the closest thing to a model that exists is in Switzerland.179 In
Switzerland, beginning in 1999, several changes were made to its
constitution to gradually allow for the inclusion of animals.180 First,
the constitution was rewritten to include protection, but not rights, of
animals.181 Next, in 2002, animals were acknowledged as explicitly
not things in the Swiss Civil code.182 And finally, in 2009, Switzerland
further amended its constitution to recognize that animals are beings
and not things.183 However, even with the seemingly progressive
nature of Switzerland’s approach, a 2010 referendum that would have
granted standing to domestic animals was defeated, suggesting that the
status of animals under the law, even in a place like Switzerland, is
always precarious.184 Moreover, the 2010 referendum was only for
companion species, so ever if passed, animals with significantly higher
cognitive abilities would still not have standing.185
Although the status of animals under the law in Switzerland is
promising, there is still no indication that animals are being considered
in their multiplicity, which a posthumanist approach would require.186
Interestingly, the United States has previously recognized the
multiplicity of species through federal legislation with both the
Endangered Species Act187 and the Humane Methods of Slaughter
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Act.188 The Endangered Species Act allows for the identification of
vulnerable species and the enactment of protective measures for those
identified species.189 Similarly, the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
recognizes the difference between species because it does not cover
chickens, which, by volume, are the most slaughtered animals in the
United States.190 Both of these acts promote animal welfare and
recognize that different animal species require different forms of
protection.191 Unfortunately, because of the legacy of liberal
humanism, the Endangered Species Act falls short because, although it
recognizes the difference between animal species by being based on
categories of species vulnerability, it does not actually recognize
species multiplicity.192 The same is true for the Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act, which again recognizes the difference between species
implicitly by carving out protections for certain species, but fails to
account for a multiplicity of ethical obligations based on the
multiplicity of species.193
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IV. CONCLUSION
The current state of animal welfare and animal rights before the
law is rightfully being challenged on numerous fronts—with the
Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great Ape Project being the most
prominent examples. Both the Nonhuman Rights Project and the Great
Ape Project have sought to expand the legal rights of non-human
animals by focusing on great apes, though they have adopted different
approaches. The Nonhuman Rights Project pursues ape rights through
court challenges, while the Great Ape Project explicitly avoids the
courts and works on passing legislation. Ultimately, the Great Ape
Project has been successful in some countries, primarily Spain and
New Zealand, whereas the Nonhuman Rights Project has largely been
unsuccessful in the United States. The discrepancy in outcomes
between the two projects demonstrates the value of legislative
approaches over court challenges. Moreover, if legislation fails, as
opposed to court challenges, no precedent is set; therefore, the Great
Ape Project’s strategy is preferable. However, both the Great Ape
Project and the Nonhuman Rights Project articulate arguments steeped
in liberal humanism—these arguments might succeed in getting
nominal rights for apes, but also might forever foreclose the possibility
of “lower” species from getting access to any sort of legal rights.
Therefore, an alternative to the liberal humanist tradition must form
the basis for challenges to the legal order.
Posthumanism offers the framework and vocabulary to move
beyond the liberal humanist tradition when considering rights.
Posthumanism’s insistence on the anthropological limit prevents the
possibility of permitting all forms of human atrocities by insisting on a
division between the human and all other species. However,
posthumanism multiplies the limits and insists on absolute limits
between each species and among each species. This re-articulation
disrupts the humanist grasp on animal rights discourse by suggesting
that anything less than considering the multiplicity of species—by
considering heterogeneity—is a failure. In addition, by considering the
individual species in its uniqueness, the slippery slope argument is
rendered invalid. First, the relocation of the nexus of ethical
obligations from human-likeness to shared finitude negates the
possibility of liberal humanist articulations of rights. All that can die,
that grapples with mortality, must be considered. This radical
articulation unsettles the liberal humanist discourse because it does not
matter how human-like your species is—the species uniqueness must
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be given consideration. Therefore, there is the possibility that a highly
intelligent creature, such as an octopus, may gain access to legal
consideration that the liberal humanist tradition would preclude.
Ultimately, the lack of consideration for animals stems from the liberal
humanist origin of common law, and therefore, any meaningful change
must come not from working within the liberal humanist framework,
but rather from a radical challenge to that framework. Posthumanism
offers both the theoretical foundation and the vocabulary to mount that
challenge. In addition, because of the radical nature of posthumanism,
the Great Ape Project’s legislative approach is the only real avenue for
change; court challenges are simply too set in tradition to be amenable
to opening the possibilities that heterogenic ethical considerations
require.
Ideally, the best approach to take would be to target state
constitutions to pursue such a radical reconfiguration of how animals
are viewed under the law. However, Switzerland’s model of
recognizing animals in its constitution as “beings” and not “things”
unfortunately also shows the limitation of a constitutional approach.
The constitutional recognition of all animals as beings did not,
however, automatically change the relationship between humans and
animals, and therefore the practical effect of “being” status is little
more than a rhetorical nicety. Therefore, it is essential that any
legislative or constitutional approaches be firmly rooted in
posthumanist discourse to avoid being more than rhetorical.
Legislation must recognize the multiplicity of species and offer
various relationships between those species and the law. The
Endangered Species Act and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
are in a sense legal recognition of Derrida’s animot, but they both
collapse under interrogation. The starting point must be that all
animals are beings, but that all beings are not the same animal.

